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5 minutes with Steve Keen: “The better of two bad policies is
the stimulus approach”
Steve Keen was one of the few economists who publicly predicted the Great Recession that
still troubles developed economies. In this interview, he explains how he came to that
conclusion, offers his view on UK economic policy, and presents his own policy ideas
for ending speculative, risky behavior that created the debt burden to begin with.
Can you explain what led you to believe there would be an imminent economic
calamity when you f irst raised warning signs in 2005?
Looking at the empirical data – looking at the ratio of  private debt to GDP, it was obvious. If  you look at
the ratio [Figure below], you can see that it is obviously of  systematic control. In American data going
back to 1920 you’ll see the peaks and then collapses in the ratio of  debt to GDP have always coincided
with depressions. In the 20s and 30s debt went f rom about 100 per cent of  GDP in the early 1920s to
175 per cent in 1929-30 and then 235 per cent because of  def lation in 1932 then plunged back down to
45 per cent of  GDP through WWII. It  rose to 303 per cent of  GDP in early 2009, and has now f allen to
250 per cent. No period in the last 100 years compares to where we are now except f or the great
depression. Empirically, you have to explain how that debt grew, why it grew so much more rapidly than
income, why has it gone in reverse, and why does it matter.
There is a lot of debate in economic circles and amongst polit ical leaders between reducing
debt and propping up aggregate demand; between austerity and stimulus. What is your opinion?
The better of  two bad policies is the stimulus approach. If  you have the private sector deleveraging and
the public simultaneously trying to reduce its debt level, and banks are af raid to lend anyways because
so much bank debt has gone bad, then you have the amount of  money in the economy being reduced;
two f actors both taking money out of  circulation which will push the economy down f urther. The irony is
that you’re trying to repay debt, but the debt doesn’t f all when you go into austerity. This is the mistake
of  making the analogy between the household and the economy. In a household, if  you decide to spend
less your income doesn’t necessarily change, theref ore you can pay the debt down. But in a society,
a reduction in the rate of  turnover of  money makes everybody’s income drop in the aggregate but the
debt remains at the same level. You pay it down a bit but quite possibly in a year ’s t ime you’ll have a
higher ratio of  debt to income than you had bef orehand. That’s what happened disastrously during the
great depression.
You’ve talked about the importance of macroeconomic models incorporating the endogenous
creation of money by banks. Can you explain this idea?
Banks are required to have reserves based on the deposits they had between 30 days and 50 days
earlier. Lets say you have a bank that is already at the reserve limit and someone comes in with a great
idea and the bank likes the idea and extends the loan. If  they extend the loan they create a loan and
create a deposit and theref ore breach the reserve ratio. But they know they have 50 days to raise the
money.
The loans you make next week should be based on the reserves you had last week, which are not the
laws, so you would have to have a drastic change to the legal structure to have the exogenous creation
of  money be legally enf orced. But the reality is that we’ve seen this huge growth in the shadow banking
sector. Every time policymakers try to control the banks behavior they invent a way around it, through
legal loopholes or whatever.
Theref ore, I model the banking sector as if  there were no constraints to what it does. It simply lends
unrestrained. With that system I get results that look much more like the real world. I get the booms and
crashes and so on.
You’ve described the banking sector as parasit ic. What do you mean by this? 
You necessarily need banking to expand the money supply to f inance investment. Change in debt is the
main source of  f inancing of  investment. Schumpeter and Minsky made the case that the change in debt is
the main source of  investment f unds – so you need that f or a healthy f unctioning of  the capitalist
system. Also the change in debt f inances purchasing of  f inancial sector assets. So you get a relationship
between the change in debt and not just investment, which you want, but also speculation on the value
of  assets, which you don’t want because that’s where the bubbles come f rom. What you get is a posit ive
f eedback process. The change in debt actually sustains the prices of  f inancial assets, theref ore the
acceleration of  debt determines which direction those prices are going to go – theref ore if  you have
accelerating levels of  debt you have rising asset prices which of  course sucks people back in again.
That’s what gives you a bubble and that’s why the bubble has to burst.
How would you end speculative, risky banking behavior so as to avoid asset bubbles?
What you need to control risky banking behavior is a set of  policies that break the link between change in
debt and asset prices. And I’ve put f orward two ideas and these are post crisis ideas because the crisis
itself  isn’t addressed by them. One of  them is to redef ine shares in what I call jubilee shares.
The idea would be at the moment when you buy a share it lasts f orever. That enables people to say, buy
these shares in this strange company called yahoo, which you can currently buy f or 20 bucks and in a
years’ t ime it is guaranteed to be 1000. And of  course it goes f rom 20 to 400 and right back down to 20
once more 4, about the price it is now. And only because there’s no limit to the number of  t imes it can be
sold, and theref ore it lasts f orever,
What I propose is that with jubilee shares, if  you bought a share f rom a company in an IPO, yes it lasts
f orever, just like it does now. You could sell it  someone else but only a def ined number of  t imes. My idea,
using a biblical idea, is seven times. That gives you enough of  price discovery to get a realistic idea of
what the company should be priced at. But af ter the seventh time it lasts 50 years and then it expires.
And the idea is that it would take a blithering idiot to borrow money to buy jubilee shares. So you remove
the incentive between rising debt levels and asset prices in the share market.
The other policy I call the PILL – property income limited leverage. At the moment if  you and I are
competing over a house in London somewhere and you and I both had the same amount of  income
and money saved, and we went to a bank and you got a 95 per cent loan to valuation ratio f or your
income and I got a 94 per cent you’d get the place. We both have an interest in bidding up the amount the
bank will lend to us to buy the house -  which is what causes housing price bubbles. So my idea f or the pill
is that the amount of  money that a bank can lend is limited not by the income of  the people competing
f or the house, but the income earning capacity of  the house they want to buy. So you and I are both
f ighting over a place which say could earn 50k pounds a year in rent, then the max that you or I could
borrow f rom a bank is half  a million pounds. And then if  you wanted to beat me you need to save more of
your income then I did. Then you get a negative relationship between house prices and leverage rather
than a posit ive one.
So those two rules alone would mean that the attractiveness of  borrowing money to gamble on rising
asset prices would not be completely eliminated – you could not eliminate it totally – but would be
reduced enough that it would no longer be a problem.
What’s in store for UK economy considering the high private debt to GDP ratio?
I’ve analyzed the data recording the private debt to GDP ratio in England at the moment. It ’s 450 per cent,
250 per of  which is f inancial sector debt alone. America peaked at 300 per cent. It ’s actually the rate of
change of  the debt that has an ef f ect on aggregate demand.
In England the change in debt bounced around like the cardiogram of  somebody about to duf f er a
cardiac arrest. At various times, given the substantial amount of  debt, the change in debt was equivalent
to around 60 per cent of  GDP in nominal terms.
It shows the extent to which this is a Ponzi economy. I don’t think the growth in debt can be sustained
any longer. Now you’re seeing the debt to GDP ratio f alling about. At some point it will go strongly
negative. All the instruments people have swapped around town and called assets will be regarded as
toxic. I shall not be surprised if  there is a severe credit crunch in England in the next one or two years.
Now the deleveraging crisis will be more severe here than in America because your deleveraging f rom a
f ar higher level of  debt. Of  course, because the government is running an austerity programme, the
government may well trigger it. With a f all of  demand that comes out of  the austerity programme f eeding
back in to private behavior -  causing a slowdown in the rate of  private debt -  and all the hot money that’s
been part of  the prosperity of  this town deciding to relocate back to wherever it came f rom, it will be
serious credit crunch material.
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